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1. Introduction  
The past decade has seen the advent of a rare and under researched phenomenon: the company-
commissioned ‘independent’ inquiry (CCII) into aspects of mining industry social performance.3 
Initiated by global mining companies – generally as a result of pressure exerted by external events 
and stakeholders – CCIIs have largely been conducted in situations where community grievances 
about operational impacts are longstanding and acute. These situations are often characterised by 
weak state institutions with gross imbalances in economic and political power.  
The global community is demanding greater transparency from the private sector and the advent of 
CCIIs suggest a corporate willingness to pursue unconventional forms of inquiry to understand 
complex issues where companies carry (or are seen to carry) responsibilities. Findings of CCIIs 
may not always be what participants in the process expect, but the potential for identifying new 
pathways to remedy and reconciliation appears to be greater than if such processes were not 
attempted in the first place. On this basis alone, CCIIs deserve greater attention. 
CCIIs are a vehicle for responding to – even pre-empting – complex stakeholder issues in the 
context of resource extraction. A cursory review shows that CCIIs are usually sparked by 
underlying grievances. These are typically high-stakes environments: there is a need to make good 
decisions in a complex situation, where the available facts are contested, and where human rights 
risks are present. Whether CCIIs are appropriate in these circumstances needs careful 
consideration. Companies are expected, through instruments such as the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), to establish a comprehensive understanding 
of how their activities impact individuals and communities, and how those impacts intersect with 
internationally recognised human rights.4 CCIIs are one means through which companies can 
demonstrate these efforts.  
Large-scale mining developments are complex: they straddle national boundaries, economies and 
cultures, and intersect with the rights, interests and worldviews of different groups, in unique and 
often problematic ways. These circumstances are bound to raise issues that are difficult to resolve, 
and if left unchecked over the course of the mine lifecycle, can become intractable. Ensuring 
principles can be applied across different contexts, across a range of dimensions, and from a 
variety of stakeholder perspectives is pivotal to these processes being activated with integrity.  
2. About this paper 
In determining whether CCIIs are an appropriate tool for investigating complex issues and 
incidents in the mining industry, it is important to first establish a basic understanding about their 
use. This paper considers seven international CCIIs commissioned over the past ten years, and 
                                               
3  One of the few studies in this area pre-dates most of the CCIIs considered in this paper. See: 
https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/studentpaper_3_lombardo_santiago.pdf.  
4  See: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.   
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describes them – both in terms of the methodologies used, and so far as can be readily 
determined, the outputs and outcomes which resulted. While these processes have advantages 
over the industry’s more internal and “closed” approach to addressing and investigating issues, this 
brief review has established that there is potential to increase the effectiveness of CCIIs. For this 
reason, the paper compares CCIIs with approaches taken by seven, resource sector-related, 
government-commissioned independent inquiries (GCIIs).5 GCIIs tend to carry an authority that is 
not available to CCIIs (e.g. legislative powers of investigation), nevertheless there is much that can 
be learned from this established state-sanctioned practice. 
We maintain that CCIIs cannot offset the need for companies to implement careful, comprehensive 
approaches to social performance and human rights due diligence from the outset of mining 
activities. Rather, this paper highlights further work that could enhance the acceptance, and the 
effectiveness, of CCIIs commissioned in the future. Such work needs to proceed on the premise 
that these processes are appropriate for investigating complex cases, and that companies accept 
and act on their prior responsibilities to avoid and mitigate harms arising from their activities.   
This paper provides a preliminary desktop review of CCIIs as they have been used in the mining 
sector. It does not purport to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the inquiries considered. Nor 
does the paper seek to provide definitive advice about whether, when, and how, CCIIs should be 
undertaken. Rather, the paper identifies topics that could be further explored by researchers, with 
input from mining companies, communities, civil society, researchers and other stakeholders. One 
outcome of further research could be a “model” for companies to voluntarily and proactively 
engage complex problems, and discover solutions, through a robust CCII approach. This could 
include a set of principles or recommendations for responsible inquiry conduct.  
3. Background context 
The CCIIs considered for this paper were initiated during a decade in which business responsibility 
for human rights enjoyment, and for responding to allegations of corporate human rights abuse, 
was being defined. The 2008 UN “Protect, Respect, Remedy” Framework, and the 2011 UNGPs, 
clarified business’ responsibility to “respect” human rights, and to ensure that victims of abuse 
have access to “remedy”. 6 These pillars are underpinned by a core process: human rights due 
diligence. The UNGPs require companies to exercise due diligence to ensure that their activities do 
not cause harm to people, and, if they do cause harm, that remedies can be obtained.  
The CCIIs considered in this paper represent occasions where companies have recognised a need 
to establish clarity over allegations made about human rights harms caused, or that may have 
been caused, by their mining operations. They also reflect circumstances where the project-level 
grievance mechanisms envisaged in the UNGPs were insufficient to the task. The CCIIs examined 
                                               
5  These government-commissioned independent inquiries are sourced from the Australian context given 
the authors’ familiarity with this jurisdiction. Similarly, comparisons could be made with commissions of 
inquiry from other countries. 
6  See: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.   
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were generally initiated in situations where complex, highly publicised, issues had escalated to the 
point where the company deemed that some other, novel, process was necessary.  
CCIIs are not the only non-judicial form of form of inquiry to have emerged during this same period. 
Several other types of inquiry processes have attempted to create an independent process for 
investigating community grievances. The International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Compliance 
Adviser Ombudsman (CAO), is a well-recognised example.7 Such processes, however, are 
initiated by project-affected people. When this occurs, companies face pressure to participate and, 
under these circumstances, can tend to be defensive.8 The focus in these situations can easily 
shift from an investigative mindset to companies looking to protect their interests and reputation. 
Nonetheless, as with CCIIs, the IFC CAO represents an attempt to ensure that local communities 
affected by mining have legitimate mechanisms through which to have their grievances 
considered, and to find pathways to remedy.   
The pressures that led companies to initiate CCIIs are not likely to abate, and may intensify, in the 
near future. Our review of mining companies’ risk screening and assessment processes elsewhere 
suggests that social incident investigation models and methods are not well established. 
Operational-level personnel are not routinely trained in identifying the human rights dimensions of 
issues, and can be reluctant to elevate issues and incidents to senior company management 
based on their analysis. Likewise, the industry’s willingness and capacity to conduct retrospective 
reviews of social incidents is limited compared with workplace safety and environmental incidents. 
In these circumstances, opportunities for early and effective responses to allegations of 
indefensible social impacts and human rights abuse can easily be lost.  
At the same time, external scrutiny of company approaches to human rights and social 
performance continues to strengthen. It is therefore prudent to further consider both the past, and 
potential future, appropriateness, and utility of CCIIs. Where disputes have accelerated beyond the 
reach of project-level grievance mechanisms, CCIIs may be one means for companies to 
demonstrate due diligence under the UNGPs, and to avoid more punitive processes, which can 
become resource and time intensive for all parties. The recent release of the Zero Draft of a 
Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, serves as a reminder of the potential 
consequences for mining companies of failing to adequately address social performance issues 
and incidents.9 
4. Scope and structure of the paper 
The CCIIs examined in this paper are operationally-specific. In each case, the commissioning 
entity took deliberate steps to formally separate itself from the oversight, management, and daily 
conduct of the investigation or assessment. In each case, a new, time-limited, body with the 
                                               
7  The CAO is the independent recourse mechanism for the IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). The CAO responds to complaints from project-affected communities with the goal of 
enhancing social and environmental outcomes on the ground. See: http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/  
8  An IFC CAO process can be initiated for IFC-financed projects, or where the IFC has an equity stake. 
Companies can decide whether they participate or not. 
9  See: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/about-us/blog/debate-the-treaty; https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty; https://www.somo.nl/topic/business-human-rights/.  
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specific stated responsibility of obtaining and evaluating information ‘independently’ was 
established. These bodies sought to engender stakeholder confidence that the inquiry process was 
transparent, credible, and fair, and, at least by implication, fundamentally different from alternative 
approaches such as direct consultancies.10  
In contrast, the seven GCIIs are not operationally-specific and, in all but one case, were focused 
on a resource sector issue or set of issues in more general terms. Each GCII was contending with 
elevated levels of stakeholder anxiety, discordant perceptions of the facts surrounding the inquiry 
subject matter, considerable media interest, and high, often conflicting, expectations of stakeholder 
groups. In these respects, the Australian GCIIs assessed for this paper have much in common with 
the CCIIs considered.  
Each inquiry considered for this paper has been analysed in terms of its:  
 aims and purpose 
 structure and scope 
 approach to independence 
 treatment of evidence and information  
 openness and transparency  
 engagement with stakeholders 
 outputs and outcomes. 
While the authors’ understanding of the internal workings of several inquiries has contributed to 
this paper, in the main, information has been collected from public sources. It has not been 
possible to incorporate the views of local communities or other stakeholder groups on CCII 
processes, or to observe outcomes. As a result, our analysis is preliminary. A deeper, richer, 
analysis of CCIIs, and their consequences, will require direct engagement with those involved.  
The paper is structured to provide:  
 brief summaries of each CCII 
 an assessment of the issues and implications arising  
 brief summaries of each GCII 
 an initial analysis of the potential learnings for CCIIs from GCIIs  
 suggestions for further research. 
                                               
10  The Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project was a multi-company inquiry 
commissioned in 2002 that examined how the mining and metals sector could contribute to sustainable 
development.10 The MMSD has not been examined in this report. Convened by the International Institute 
of Environment and Development (IIED) as the independent third party, the MMSD was global in scope, 
with approximately 175 individual studies commissioned during the course of the project, across multiple 
issues and operations. While notable, the drivers, scope and coverage of the MMSD differ from the 
operationally-specific CCIIs included in this report. 
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5. Company-commissioned independent inquiries  
The seven CCIIs considered in this paper are listed in Table 1.11 
Table 1: CCIIs considered in this paper 
Date Inquiry title 
2007 – 2008 Review of Cerrejón Coal and Social Responsibility – Impacts and Intent 
2007 – 2009 Newmont Mining Corporation Community Relationships Review 
2008 – 2010 Human Rights Assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine in Guatemala 
2015 – 2016 Independent Assessment of the Porgera Remedy Framework 
2015 – 2016 Yanacocha Independent Fact Finding Mission on Tragadero Grande 
2016 – 2017 Review of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) within a Human Rights 
Framework: Lessons from a Suriname case study  
2017 – 2020 Amulsar Independent Advisory Panel: First Annual Report 
Brief summaries of each of these CCIIs follow. In keeping with the source restrictions outlined 
earlier, the summaries provided below are, of necessity, limited.  
5.1 Review of Cerrejón Coal and Social Responsibility: Impacts and 
Intent 
The Cerrejón Review was commissioned by Cerrejón Coal and its owners, Anglo American, BHP 
Billiton and Glencore, in August 2007 as part of negotiated response to a complaint filed with the 
Australian National Contact Point (ANCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.12 
The Cerrejón mine, in Colombia, had been strongly criticised over the past forcible removal of 
indigenous communities. The complaint alleged that attempted depopulation of one township in 
2001 had caused suffering and hardship; and sought an appropriate process to manage future 
relocation of other communities.  
The Review was described as an independent assessment of the company’s past and current 
social engagement. Internally, it seems that the Review was viewed as an opportunity to ‘reset’ 
Cerrejón Coal’s relationships with local communities, and to assure interested non-government 
                                               
11  Other similar exercises preceded the seven CCIIs reviewed in this paper. For example, we are aware that 
in 2004 Freeport McMoRan initiated a Social and Human Rights Audit of the Grasberg mine in West 
Papua, following a process not dissimilar to that which is described in this report. This report is no longer 
available in the public domain. 
12  See: https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/112/2018/02/Cerrejon_Panel.pdf.  
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organisations (NGOs) of the company’s intention to shift its social performance to align with 
international best practice.  
Cerrejón Coal appointed a four person Panel selected on the basis of expertise, and acceptability 
to international stakeholders (two of the four panellists worked for international NGOs), to oversee 
the review. The criteria used to select the Panel do not appear to have been publicised. Panellists 
have since suggested that prior engagement with Cerrejón led to their names being put forward.13 
The Panel appointed social issues consultancy, Social Capital Group, to conduct field work.14  
Both the panellists and the consultants were paid directly by Cerrejón Coal. It is not known what 
arrangements, financial or otherwise, were made to reinforce the independence of the Panel’s 
work.  
The Panel conducted stakeholder meetings in Colombia, and the consultants carried out what 
were described as ‘extensive’ in-field interviews and observations, (SCG’s report on this field-work 
has not been published). Documents, both company, and public, were reviewed. The approach 
taken by the Panel to the testing, and weighing, of the information provided has not been publicly 
described.   
At the outset, Cerrejón Coal undertook to release an executive summary of the Review report. In 
the event, the full report was provided on both the company’s and the shareholders’ websites. 
Cerrejón also placed a detailed response to the Review on its site. The company continues to 
provide annual progress reports on its social commitments in response to the Review Report. It is 
unclear what other steps were taken to engage with community members on the Report.  
The Cerrejón Review provided the impetus for a number of changes to social policy and practice at 
the mine. The Review also spurred completion of a financial agreement between the company and 
two communities. The company, and its shareholders, were praised by some NGOs for their 
commitment to public accountability. Nevertheless, a subsequent study found that some local 
community members had questioned both the independence and transparency of the Review 
process.15  
5.2 Newmont Mining Corporation Community Relationships Review 
This Review was triggered by a shareholder resolution following continued, sometimes severe, 
conflict between communities and the company at several locations worldwide. The Review sought 
to evaluate the effectiveness of Newmont’s approach to ‘management of community risks 
associated with company activities’ by focusing on five (later expanded to six) mine sites in 
differing operating environments.16  
                                               
13  See: https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/studentpaper_3_lombardo_santiago.pdf. 
14  See: www.s-c-g.net/en. 
15  See: https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/studentpaper_3_lombardo_santiago.pdf. 
16  See: https://s1.q4cdn.com/259923520/files/doc_downloads/crr/CRR-Global-Summary-Report-and-
Appendices-English.pdf.  
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The Review structure was relatively complex, with an eight member Advisory Panel, Study 
Directors responsible for preparation of the final summary report, and Site Study Teams for each 
jurisdiction. The Panel Chair was recruited directly by Newmont. The Chair then worked with 
Newmont to identify potential panellists. Again, the criteria used to select these panellists do not 
appear to have been made publicly available. Ultimately the Panel included a community 
representative, an ‘ethical investor’ representative, and individuals from NGOs. The Study 
Directors were also appointed directly by Newmont. Study Teams, who were a mix of researchers 
and consultants, were chosen through consultation between Newmont, the (initial) Study Director, 
and the Advisory Panel.  
Several steps were taken to bolster the independence of the Review process. The Advisory Panel 
were empowered to provide their own, unedited, public report on the Review. Study Directors and 
Site Teams were required to formally document their independence from the company. 
Nevertheless, while panellists felt strongly that the Review was independent from the company, 
some Study Teams indicated that Newmont had influenced the structure, content and tone of their 
final site reports, when commenting on draft versions.17 Both the Study Directors and Study Teams 
were paid directly by Newmont. Panel members were offered the option of no compensation if they 
so chose.  
The Study Teams reviewed corporate documents, and conducted brief (several days to a week) 
site visits, interviewing both company and external stakeholders.18 The process by which the 
information gathered was tested, or weighed, is not described in the consolidated Global Summary 
Report.  
At the commencement of the Review, Newmont committed to making the findings public. The 
Global Summary Report, inclusive of five site reports and the Advisory Panel’s separate report, 
were ultimately published on Newmont’s website in English, Spanish and Bahasa. Newmont’s 
response, and annual progress reports are also available on the site.  
There was some stakeholder criticism about the level of engagement and transparency during the 
Review. Other authors highlighted concerns expressed about the year-long gap between the 
conduct of interviews, and feedback being provided to interviewees; and about a perceived inability 
for community members to contact the Panel whilst the Review was in progress.19  
The Community Relationships Review provided Newmont with lessons and guidance which the 
company explains as subsequently incorporated into policy and practice changes at corporate 
level, and at sites.  
                                               
17  See: https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/studentpaper_3_lombardo_santiago.pdf.  
18  Noting that some Study Teams had previously visited these sites for other assessment work, and were 
otherwise familiar with the site context. 
19  See: https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/studentpaper_3_lombardo_santiago.pdf. 
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5.3 Human Rights Assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine in 
Guatemala 
In early 2008, following a series of protests, and public pressure from an ethical investors 
shareholder group, Goldcorp agreed to commission an independent assessment of potential 
human rights impacts at its Marlin Mine in Guatemala. The assessment was aimed at evaluating 
the company’s past performance, informing Goldcorp’s future policies and practices, and, 
according to the ethical investors, ‘setting a benchmark for mining companies operating in high risk 
countries’.20  
The Assessment was overseen by a three person Steering Committee directly appointed by 
Goldcorp. The Committee was representative in nature, encompassing one appointee from 
Goldcorp, one from the ethical investors’ group, and one from a Guatemalan NGO. The Committee 
issued a call for proposals to conduct the Assessment, ultimately choosing social performance 
consultancy, On Common Ground (OCG).  
OCG have indicated that they worked independently from the company, (they reported to the 
Steering Committee); had complete control over the determination of which groups to meet with; 
and that Goldcorp had no say in regard to the form, content, or findings of the final report. 
Nevertheless the process was strongly criticised by NGOs on the basis that inclusion of a Goldcorp 
senior executive on the Committee had given the company undue influence over the results. OCG 
was paid directly by Goldcorp.  
The assessors spent more than 180 days in Guatemala and conducted interviews, informal 
discussions, and focus groups on a relatively large scale. Extensive documentary material from 
company, public, and stakeholder group sources was reviewed, and two expert reports were 
commissioned. The final report describes the process used to test, and weigh the evidence 
gathered through these different mechanisms. The report indicates OCG utilised United States 
Government Auditing Office ‘standards for guidance on determining the reasonableness of 
evidence’, with ’particular attention being given to not overstepping available information’.21  
At the outset, an Assessment website was established, which displayed the Assessment 
objectives, and the agreement between the ethical investors and Goldcorp, and, subsequently, 
minutes of Assessment Steering Committee meetings. During the initial months of the 
Assessment, community updates were also provided on the website. The final report was 
published on the Assessment website, (in both English and Spanish), and on the Goldcorp 
website. Goldcorp’s formal response was also published on their website, as were progress reports 
on implementation of the Assessment recommendations. Goldcorp’s implementation of 
                                               
20  See: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/investors-spur-goldcorp-to-address-human-rights-in-
guatemala.  
21  See: http://q4dev.s11.clientfiles.s3-website-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/653477107/files/doc_downloads/portfolio_docs/marlin/OCG_HRA_Marlin_Mine_May_
17_linked.pdf.   
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Assessment findings has since been independently reviewed, with that review also being made 
available on the company website.  
The Assessment provided Goldcorp with specific opportunities for improvement, which have been 
reportedly actioned by the company. Conduct of the process also seems to have provided 
reassurance to the Guatemalan Government about Goldcorp’s approach to human rights. 
Nonetheless, some NGOs remain convinced that the Assessment was fundamentally flawed from 
the outset, given the composition of the Steering Committee.  
5.4 Independent Assessment of the Porgera Remedy Framework 
Barrick Gold commissioned the Assessment following a recommendation from the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights that there be an independent review of the implementation 
of the Porgera Remedy Framework. The Framework was established by the company to provide 
remedies for survivors of sexual violence perpetrated by individuals associated with the Porgera 
Mine in Papua New Guinea. The Framework had been criticised by both local and international 
NGOs.  
The Assessment sought to establish the degree to which the Framework had been implemented as 
it had been designed; and how well or otherwise the Framework aligned with the UNGPs. The 
company indicated that it also hoped to provide durable lessons for other businesses with respect 
to operational level grievance mechanisms.  
The Assessment was overseen by a three person External Committee which included two NGO 
representatives, and one individual with legal expertise. The basis for selection of the Committee 
was not publicised. The Assessment itself was conducted by Enodo Rights, a firm offering both 
legal and stakeholder engagement skills. Enodo Rights were chosen after invitations were issued 
to a number of organisations to submit proposals. The criteria used to select Enodo Rights were 
not made public.   
In an effort to ensure, and to be seen to ensure, independence, Barrick Gold provided all funding to 
Enodo Rights prior to research findings being shared with the company. The External Committee 
worked on a voluntary basis. The Assessors reported to the External Committee. The Assessors 
emphasised that they had been provided with full control over the conduct of the Assessment. The 
company (but no other stakeholders) were provided with the opportunity to comment on draft 
conclusions.  
The Assessors conducted a twenty-two day site visit, and consulted with local and international 
stakeholders over a fourteen week period. Enodo Rights also reviewed an extensive range of 
company, and public, documentary material. The final report describes the processes used to test 
and weigh evidence, and the standard of proof applied. The Assessors sought to consider all 
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actions from the perspective of the ‘reasonable observer’, and all decisions in the context of 
‘reasonable alternatives’.22  
Enodo Rights have indicated that they shared the Assessment Terms of Reference (TOR), an 
overview of the scope and methodology, and a summary of engagement expectations with all 
stakeholders on request. Prior to the start of the Assessment, Barrick Gold committed to making 
the Report publicly available. The final report, and the company’s formal response to it, were 
subsequently published on the Barrick Gold website.  
Given that the Assessment was largely supportive of the company’s efforts to design and 
implement the Framework, the process provided the company with some verification of its 
approach. NGOs have strongly criticised the Assessment on the basis that it was not sufficiently 
independent from the company.  
5.5 Yanacocha Independent Fact Finding Mission on Tragadero 
Grande 
The Yanacocha Independent Fact Finding Mission (YIFFM) was initiated by Newmont following 
persistent allegations by local and international stakeholders that the Minera Yanacocha operation 
in Peru had perpetrated human rights violations as part of a land dispute with a local family.  
The YIFFM was asked to consider three questions about Minera Yanacocha’s past practices, and 
to advise on the facts relevant to the human rights allegations. Subsequent comments from 
Newmont indicate that the company may have hoped that the YIFFM would dispel the allegations, 
and would ‘open pathways’ to resolve the ongoing land dispute.23   
Newmont commissioned RESOLVE, a non-profit organisation, to provide a concept for a fully 
independent process. RESOLVE appointed the YIFFM Director, who consulted with stakeholders, 
including NGOs, before appointing both Mission team members, and a four person Advisory Group 
who were charged with oversight of the YIFFM methodology and implementation.   
A number of arrangements were made to assure the independence of the process. Newmont 
provided funds to RESOLVE in scheduled instalments. There was no direct payment arrangement 
between Newmont and the Mission Team or Advisory Group. A Board member of RESOLVE, who 
was a former Newmont executive, took a leave of absence from the Board for the duration of the 
YIFFM. The Mission Director has indicated he was afforded complete independence in the conduct 
of the assessment.  
The YIFFM conducted interviews, held discussions, and analysed a wide variety of both company 
and public documents. The Mission also sought some specific documents from stakeholders. 
                                               
22  See: http://q4live.s22.clientfiles.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/788666289/files/porgera/Enodo-
Rights-Porgera-Remedy-Framework-Independent-Assessment.pdf.  
23  Elaine Dorward-King, `Newmont responds to Independent Report on Land Dispute in Peru’, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Newswire, 2016. See: www.csrwire.com/press_releases.  
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Interestingly, unlike the Porgera and Marlin cases, there is no substantive, publicly available 
explanation of how the material discovered during the YIFFM was tested and weighed. The final 
report only emphasises that information used in the report “does not meet a judicial standard of 
evidence”. 
From the outset, the YIFFM maintained a website on which a description of the Mission approach, 
a Fact Sheet, and frequently asked questions were provided, as was the opportunity to contact the 
Mission Team. Updates were provided to the local family’s attorney during the YIFFM. The family, 
and the company had the opportunity to comment on the draft report. The final report was 
published on the YIFFM website in English and Spanish. Newmont’s response to the YIFFM was 
also published on the company’s website.  
Following the completion of the YIFFM there was some increased engagement with the impacted 
family, however the underlying issues have not been unresolved. While the Mission provided 
observations, and suggestions for the future, it does not appear to have provided the level of clarity 
on the human rights allegations which had been hoped for by Newmont, particularly in terms of 
responding to the use of violence by other parties.  
5.6 Review of FPIC within a Human Rights Framework: Lessons 
from a Suriname case study  
By contrast with other CCIIs considered, there was no immediate external trigger for Newmont’s 
commissioning of the Review of FPIC at its Merian mine in Suriname. Instead, Newmont indicated 
that it saw the Review as an opportunity for the company, and others including members of the 
FPIC Solutions Dialogue group, to gain insights and improve understanding of implementation of 
FPIC in the context of large-scale mining.  
Newmont commissioned RESOLVE to appoint an Advisory Panel, chaired by RESOLVE’s 
President. The three other panel members were appointed on an expertise basis (one did work for 
an NGO). Efforts to identify a panellist from Suriname were unsuccessful.  
Funding for the Review was provided to RESOLVE. Panel members were offered an honorarium 
for their participation in the project. The Panel indicated it had full independence over the findings 
of the Review.  
The Panel conducted a four day visit to Suriname during which it held discussions with a ‘limited 
sample’ of stakeholders. The Panel also conducted a ‘rapid review of available documentation’.24 
The Panel did not publicly articulate the methodology used to test and weigh the information it 
received.  
Engagement with stakeholders (other than the company), was limited to the short in-field visit. In 
keeping with the aims of the Review, the final report was published on RESOLVE’s website in 
                                               
24  See: http://solutions-network.org/site-fpic/merian-report2017/.  
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English and Dutch and provided to FPIC Solutions Dialogue members. Newmont subsequently 
publicly committed to utilising lessons from the Review to further align its practices with FPIC.  
Newmont has since indicated that those lessons were applied to another development in Suriname 
where it was ‘honored to secure free, prior and informed consent’.25  
5.7 Amulsar Independent Advisory Panel: First Annual Report 
Lydian International established the time-limited Amulsar Independent Advisory Panel following 
community and international NGO opposition to the development of their Amulsar mine in Armenia; 
and the filing of complaints to the IFC CAO requesting a stop to project funding. The Panel’s 
mandate commenced in 2017 and runs until 2020. In this sense, the Panel is still active, unlike the 
other inquiry processes reviewed above. 
The Panel is charged with providing an independent source of advice on, and scrutiny of, the 
Amulsar project. Although the Panel’s TOR state that its ‘role will be authoritative but advisory’, the 
Panel has since indicated that it sees itself as having a pseudo-regulatory role in holding Lydian to 
account on social and environmental performance.26 This is a unique feature. 
The Panel Chair was chosen directly by Lydian. Panellists were appointed by the company in 
consultation with the Chair, and subject to the Chair’s approval. The panellists were selected on 
the basis of their expertise, with care being taken to recruit both international and Armenian 
experts. The specific criteria utilised in the selection process were not made publicly available. The 
Panel itself has the formal authority to revoke the membership of any panellist if it is felt an 
individual member is not contributing sufficiently.  
The Panel has a wide brief to consider all aspects of the social, environmental and human rights 
impacts of the Amulsar project. The Panel develops its own agenda, programme of work and 
research plan. Panellists are not allowed to have business links with Lydian or its shareholders. 
Lydian provides a per diem payment directly to the Chair, and to panellists who choose to receive 
it.  
Thus far, the Panel has reviewed a wide range of documentation, and engaged with stakeholders 
in Armenia, and elsewhere. There is no public information about the processes used by the Panel 
to test, or weigh, the information provided to it.  
The Panel maintains its own website, and publishes regular updates on its work in both English 
and Armenian. The Panel presented its first Annual Report on its website, and in a press 
conference in Armenia.  
The Panel has provided Lydian with both formal and informal advice on how to improve its 
approach to social and environmental issues. Lydian shareholders and the Armenian Government 
                                               
25  See: https://sustainabilityreport.newmont.com/2017/.   
26  See: http://www.amulsarpanel.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Amulsar-Independent-Advisory-Panel-
Annual-Report-2017-2018.pdf.   
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have expressed confidence in the Panel processes. Some NGOs remain vehemently opposed to 
mining at Amulsar, (and elsewhere in Armenia). The extent to which the Panel is prompting 
improved practice by the company, or to which community interests are being addressed, remains 
unclear.  
6. CCIIs: issues and implications 
Given that most CCIIs have been initiated in an endeavour to provide a credible basis for 
recalibrating company interactions with stakeholders on social performance and human rights 
issues, our preliminary review of CCIIs has raised questions for further consideration.  
Our position is that the credibility of any CCII will be directly related to the extent to which it can be 
demonstrated that the inquiry is:  
 independent 
 fair and balanced 
 engaged with stakeholders  
 transparent  
 impactful. 
6.1 Independent 
None of the CCIIs studied had a fully transparent process for appointing Chairs, panellists, or study 
teams. Our view is that the absence of transparency in the appointment process leaves CCIIs 
vulnerable, to varying degrees, to claims of undue influence from the company commissioning it. 
Beyond this, both the formal arrangements, and the degree of independence actually achieved 
throughout the inquiries, varies considerably.  
Circumstances where commissioning organisations were able to release funds at their discretion, 
and where companies unilaterally selected inquiry personnel, are more likely to give rise to 
scepticism about the independence of CCII processes. Those CCIIs that afforded one stakeholder 
(i.e. the commissioning company) the opportunity to comment on draft reports, without offering 
similar access to other stakeholders, can be perceived as being less than independent. These 
decisions represent opportunities for company control over the conduct of CCIIs.  
The inclusion of panel members who represented, or were seen to represent, particular 
stakeholder interests raises the question of whether those panels can be viewed as ‘independent’ 
or ‘representative’ of stakeholder interests. Whether the process is representative or independent 
should be clear from the outset. Problems arise when some stakeholders commit to supporting a 
representative process, whereas others expect independence. Notably, in the seven cases 
examined, independence seems to have been delineated solely in terms of separation from the 
company, rather than the community. Clarity about criteria for independence is another important 
consideration for establishing credibility.  
 14 
6.2 Fair and balanced 
Given the intention of the CCIIs to provide a sound platform for addressing social performance 
issues, there was a notable absence of clarity in how evidentiary material collected by, or provided 
to, inquiries was tested and weighed. Only the reports of the Marlin Mine’s Human Rights 
Assessment, and the Assessment of the Porgera Remedy Framework, contain substantive 
description of the criteria and methodology used. In the case of the Yanacocha Independent Fact 
Finding Mission, the Mission Director discussed the weighing and testing of evidentiary material 
with the Advisory Group and several other stakeholder groups at some length, but the outcomes of 
these discussions were not made available in the public domain. 
This is not to suggest that other CCIIs treated the information gathered in an unbalanced way, and 
indeed in some instances we are directly aware that this was not the case, but to highlight that 
without transparency about how information is treated, there is considerable scope for doubt as to 
the fairness of the process used. Where CCIIs are seeking to establish a credible factual base, the 
need to explain the treatment of evidentiary material is more acute. Decisions to leave certain 
detail or information out of inquiry reports to protect identities, or alleged victims, is a relevant 
factor in terms of completeness.  
Whether it occurs in substance or not, an absence of clarity on how evidence is assessed leaves 
open the prospect that material provided by some stakeholders may have been given more weight 
than information provided by others, or that the CCII panellists and consultants may have chosen 
to privilege the opinions of those who they were already biased towards. Where the validity of the 
CCII is under scrutiny it is not sufficient to rely, as several CCIIs have done, on the notion that the 
‘experts’ assessed the information provided ‘expertly’. 
6.3 Engaged with stakeholders  
All of the CCIIs considered in this paper met directly with stakeholders, and sought their views on 
issues, often through a semi-structured interview process. Some CCIIs involved substantial 
engagement, over an extended period, with a large number of stakeholders, whereas others were, 
as their reports emphasise, constrained by time limitations. A key question for further consideration 
in relation to future CCIIs, is how to ensure that the scope of initial stakeholder engagement is 
adequate to the range, intensity, and complexity, of the issues or incidents under examination. 
Likewise, engagement need not be confined to the gathering of evidence. Even in an otherwise 
independent process, there will opportunities to consult about different aspects of the inquiry, such 
as the TOR, or scope of work, and other criteria, before the commencement of fact finding or 
evidence gathering. 
As far as we have been able to ascertain, none of the CCIIs openly called for submissions from 
affected parties, though we are aware that some were provided, and specific documents were 
sought and obtained. A call for submissions may have provided another avenue for some groups 
to express their perspective in a more comprehensive, self-directed, manner than might be 
possible through interviews and focus groups alone. Interview processes are controlled by the 
interviewer; whereas submissions are not.  
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In most cases, CCII stakeholder engagement largely ceased after the initial field visits, and did not 
include a strategy for ongoing communication or engagement with stakeholder groups. This was a 
particular issue for some complainants and other project-affected people. Given the long 
timeframes which can elapse between field visits and the publication of reports, more regular 
engagement would be required if processes are to retain the confidence of alleged victims, and 
other parties.  
6.4 Transparent 
All of the seven CCIIs have in common the public release of the inquiry report, and the publication 
of a company response. The extent to which TOR, minutes of panel meetings, and updates on 
progress were published varied considerably. Several of the CCIIs had their own dedicated 
websites, and this afforded individuals the opportunity to contact panels directly, rather than via the 
company, or company website.  
Available information suggests, however, that most CCIIs did not make regular efforts to provide 
information on the status of the inquiry directly to impacted communities during the course of the 
inquiry’s work. We are aware that resources and timelines are ever present constraints, but 
suggest that creation of an ongoing, non-electronic, method of communication between inquiry 
panels and affected communities may have the potential to address some concerns about 
transparency. Additional time and resourcing would be required to enhance communication 
processes. 
In light of increasing pressures for corporate transparency, further thought could be given to the 
documentation and evidence made available in ‘raw’ form during an inquiry process. On what basis 
would documents and other evidence be made public, alongside an inquiry report? This is a 
particularly challenging area because there are often important reasons for ensuring information is 
kept confidential to the inquiry team – such as protecting alleged victims or not breaching 
commitments to anonymity and confidentiality. A balance must be struck between ensuring that the 
process is open and transparent, and protecting people who are vulnerable or at risk. The 
approach to transparency of evidence must be made clear from the outset. 
6.5 Impactful 
The preliminary assessment of CCIIs indicates that all of the inquiries provided companies with 
useful improvement opportunities, and contributed to policy-level change. The issue, however, is 
that tracking what the companies agreed to do as an outcome of the inquiry process, and who is 
accountable, is often difficult. Even in cases where companies report progress against 
recommendations and commitments, the reporting approach becomes more focused on activities 
rather than outcomes, and somewhat removed from some of the issues raised during the inquiry 
process. Ensuring that follow up from the inquiry process is accessible and meaningful is a key 
aspect of credibility. The post-inquiry reporting and follow up process is an area where there are 
clear opportunities for improvement.  
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The extent to which CCIIs fully achieved their original aims, led to improved relationships between 
the parties, or resulted in ongoing, substantial, changes to social performance at the operational 
level cannot be assessed without further study.  
In this preliminary review, the role of the state in the CCII process was not considered. Given that 
most of the jurisdictions in which CCIIs have been conducted have relatively undeveloped 
regulatory approaches to the social aspects of mining, some inquiries may have served to fill a 
regulatory gap – and in the Amulsar case the Panel seems to be overtly doing so. The extent to 
which CCIIs are in a position to influence the state, or indeed should be doing so, is an outstanding 
question. Likewise, there is the question of whether states should be involved in the inquiry 
process itself. This will depend on the context, as the state apparatus has often contributed to 
longstanding grievances and legacy issues. This is another area that further research could 
usefully engage. 
7. Government-commissioned independent inquiries  
Many advanced democratic states use GCIIs to examine complex and alarming social problems.27 
Australian states and territories typically commission independent inquiries when a particular issue 
is of strong community concern; where the facts of a situation are contested or unknown; and, 
commonly, where the government is contemplating policy or regulatory change. As such, the 
genesis of these GCIIs is somewhat different to that of the CCIIs considered for this paper.  
However, in other, significant, ways both government and privately commissioned inquiries have 
similar aims. Just as CCIIs do, the GCIIs included in this study were constructed to provide an 
independent view, were expected to engage with key stakeholders, and were tasked with providing 
a credible basis for future action. The two types of inquiry may not be directly comparable, but 
there may be potential for some aspects of government processes to be successfully applied in the 
CCII context.  
As indicated, the seven GCIIs chosen for this paper all related to controversial issues with 
implications for the resources sector in Australian states (Table 2). Brief summaries of each of 
these GCIIs follow.  
  
                                               
27  The Kerner Commission on Civil Disorder established by United States President Lyndon Johnson in 
1967 is one example. The Scarman report commissioned in 1981 by the Government of the United 
Kingdom following extensive rioting in London is another.  
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Table 2: GCIIs considered in this paper. 
Date Inquiry title 
2006 – 2008 Independent Inquiry into the Impacts of Underground Mining on Natural 
Features in the Southern Coalfield (New South Wales) 
2014 – 2016 Hazelwood Mine Fire Board of Inquiry (Victoria) 
2015 – 2016 South Australian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission 
2015 – 2016 Victorian Inquiry into the Labour Hire Industry and Insecure Work 
2016 – 2018 Scientific Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory 
2017 – 2018 Independent Scientific Panel Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracture Stimulation in 
Western Australia 
2018 – Independent Expert Panel for Mining in the Greater Sydney Water Catchment 
(New South Wales) 
 
7.1 Independent Inquiry into the Impacts of Underground Mining on 
Natural Features in the Southern Coalfield  
This Inquiry was initiated following continuing community concern about the perceived impacts of 
underground mining on water catchments in the Southern Coalfield of New South Wales.28 The 
Inquiry was required to review existing impacts, to provide advice on future minimization and 
management of issues, and to establish a sound basis for assessments of subsequent mining 
applications.  
The Inquiry was conducted by a five person expert Panel appointed by the New South Wales 
Government. There was no representation from mining companies, community groups, 
government or other stakeholders. While the selection criteria used to choose the Panel were not 
made available, the Government did publicly discuss panellists’ expertise and suitability at the time 
of their appointment.  
The Panel was provided with a set of instructions by the Government. Significantly, those 
instructions on the conduct of the Panel were publicised. The Panel were required to call for 
                                               
28  See: 
http://www.georgesriver.org.au/IgnitionSuite/uploads/docs/Impacts%20of%20Underground%20Coal%20
Mining%20on%20Natural%20Features%20in%20the%20Southern%20Coalfields%20-
%20July%202008.pdf.  
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submissions, and conduct hearings. Beyond this, the Panel had control over day-to-day process, 
and the contents of the final report. The Panel was paid directly by the Government.  
The Panel received and considered 53 initial public submissions, more than half from community 
groups and individuals. All submissions were placed on a government website, and further 
comment invited. This resulted in 13 supplementary submissions. In addition to conducting public 
hearings, (where again, community members were well represented), the Panel reviewed 
documents, received initial ‘briefings’ from stakeholders including government, mining, and 
community groups, and conducted field visits.  
The Panel’s report was made available on a Government website and widely publicised. It does 
not describe the processes it used to test, or weigh, the information provided.  
The Inquiry led to changes in government policy and practice. The information available suggests 
that while not all stakeholders agreed with Inquiry findings, the exercise was largely accepted as 
being an independent, credible, one.  
7.2 Hazelwood Mine Fire Board of Inquiry (Victoria) 
This Inquiry was initiated in response to ongoing public concern about the physical, social, and 
mental health impacts of the 45 day Hazelwood Mine fire on the Victorian town of Morwell and 
surrounding areas.29 The Inquiry was asked to examine the origins and control of the fire; and the 
adequacy of responses to it by the mine operator, and government agencies. The Inquiry was 
expected to provide recommendations for the future.  
The Victorian Government appointed a three person expert panel to conduct the Inquiry. No parties 
with direct interests in the case were represented on the Panel. The Victorian Premier indicated 
that the Panel Chair, who was already well known in Victoria, had been chosen mindful of his 
previous experience in chairing an earlier bushfire Royal Commission. The Government publicised 
the Panel’s expertise at the time of the appointment. The Panel’s independence was protected in 
Victorian law. Panellists were paid directly by the Victorian Premier’s Department.  
The Panel was authorised to conduct the Inquiry ‘as it considers appropriate […] having regard to 
the desirability of adopting informal and flexible procedures that engage with the affected 
communities … [and] … ascertain the facts.’30 The Panel publicised the approach that it intended 
to use to test and weigh evidence from the outset of the process. 
The Panel called for public submissions (660 were ultimately received), engaged independent 
experts to provide reports on particular issues, held facilitated community discussions, (including 
one specifically for a local indigenous community), and held three weeks of public hearings. The 
Panel also considered a wide range of documents.  
                                               
29  See: http://report.hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/.  
30  Victoria Government Gazette, 21 March 2014. 
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The Panel made considerable effort to encourage community engagement, delivering thousands of 
flyers to homes, and community centres, as well as utilising media appearances, newspaper 
advertisements, and social media. Throughout the course of the Inquiry, a wide range of other 
material was progressively provided on the Inquiry website. This included summaries of community 
consultations, written submissions, and transcripts of hearings.  
The Inquiry Report was placed on the website, and press releases issued. The Government 
response to the Inquiry was widely publicised, and made available in full on line. The Victorian 
Government committed to implementing all of the Inquiry recommendations and to allocating 
substantial funding to do so. Community representatives and other stakeholders have since 
publicly praised the consultative, and transparent, approach taken by the Inquiry; and the 
Government response.  
7.3 South Australian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission 
The Commission was established to inquire into the feasibility of any further expansion of the 
nuclear industry in South Australia, to identify the potential environmental, community, and 
economic impacts, and to advise on measures that might be taken to manage risks.31  
As this was a Royal Commission, established under the Royal Commissions Act 1917, the process 
was overseen by an independent Commissioner, supported by expert advisory panels, and 
Commission staff. The Commissioner, a former Governor of South Australia, was already widely 
known, and well regarded, in the State. Following initial criticism from one NGO that the 
Commissioner had a ‘pro-nuclear bias’, the Commissioner conducted a range of media interviews 
to assert his own, and the Commission’s independence. Some NGOs also accused the 
Commission of having a pro-business bias on the basis that one of the consultants who prepared 
an expert report had links to the nuclear industry.  All those assisting the Commission were legally 
required to disclose whether they had any employment, consulting or research links that might be 
considered relevant to the Commission’s work. The Commissioner, and Commission staff, were 
funded by the South Australian Government. The independence of the Commission process is 
protected under South Australian law.  
The Commission adopted an ‘evidence based’ approach to the information provided to it. While the 
Commission did not seek to achieve a legal standard of proof, it did indicate from the outset that 
the basis for all claims made would be tested, and that information would be assessed for 
reliability.  
At the commencement of the inquiry, the Commission held public information sessions on the 
TOR, and the process to be followed. The Commission then called for written public submissions 
(ultimately more than 250 were received), held 37 days of public hearings, had regular 
engagement with indigenous communities, and conducted field visits. Following concerns 
expressed by indigenous representatives, the Commission accepted oral submissions outside of 
                                               
31  See: http://nuclearrc.sa.gov.au/.  
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the hearings process; and provided explanatory documents in indigenous languages prior to 
engaging in discussions with communities. The Commission released issues papers for comment.  
The Commission progressively provided a wide range of information on its website, including 
submissions, descriptions of field visits, and transcripts of evidence. Hearings were streamed 
online. The Commission’s tentative findings were published for consideration and comment. The 
Commission held community information sessions on the preliminary findings. The final report, and 
the Government response to it were placed on Commission and Government websites and widely 
publicised.  
The South Australian Government ultimately chose to only partially support the Commission’s 
findings, but did indicate that they saw the Commission as having provided a sound basis for 
consideration of issues associated with expansion of the nuclear industry.  
7.4 Victorian Inquiry into the Labour Hire Industry and Insecure 
Work 
This Inquiry was called in response to concerns expressed prior to the election of the Victorian 
Labor Government by trade unions opposed to increasing use of labour hire and short term 
contracting.32 The Inquiry was conducted as a Formal Review under the Victorian Inquiries Act 
meaning that it was not bound by formal rules of evidence and could gain and assess information 
as it saw fit.  
The Inquiry was conducted by an independent Commissioner, supported by an Inquiry Secretariat. 
The basis for selection of the Commissioner was not made public. The Commissioner was 
expected to call for submissions, to conduct hearings, and to consult extensively. Day-to-day 
independence of the Inquiry was protected under Victorian law.   
The Commission ultimately received almost 700 initial submissions, conducted 17 days of both 
public and closed hearings, held policy forums with various subject matter experts, issued requests 
for information, and considered a wide range of other documentation.  
The Inquiry website was progressively updated with information including the TOR, submissions, 
supplementary submissions, the Commissioner’s comments at the opening of hearings, 
background papers and fact sheets. The final report, and the Government response to it, were 
made available online, and widely publicised.  
The Victorian Government accepted, in full or in part, all of the Inquiry recommendations and made 
policy and other changes as a result. While some stakeholders continued to disagree with the 
Inquiry findings, and its original impetus, the conduct of the process was broadly supported.  
  
                                               
32  See: https://economicdevelopment.vic.gov.au/inquiry-into-the-labour-hire-industry.  
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7.5 Scientific Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern 
Territory 
This Inquiry was instituted by the Northern Territory Government to assess the environmental, 
cultural and social risks of hydraulic fracturing, to advise on whether and how these risks could be 
mitigated to an acceptable level, and to identify priority areas for ‘no go zones’.33 The Government 
aimed to use the Inquiry results as a basis for deciding whether to lift a moratorium on hydraulic 
fracturing.  
The Inquiry was conducted by a nine person expert Panel, chaired by an interstate judge, and 
absent any representation from stakeholder groups. The reasons for panellists’ selection were 
widely publicised. The appointment of the Chair was endorsed by a wide variety of stakeholders, 
however some NGOs did query whether the Panel had the right mix of skills.  
The Inquiry was provided with a broad outline of the methodology it needed to use, including, for 
example, that it needed to develop and publicly release a stakeholder engagement plan, 
encompassing opportunities for written submissions, community meetings, and public hearings. 
The required Inquiry methodology was widely publicised. Beyond this, the day-to-day functioning of 
the Inquiry was left with the Panel. The independence of the process was protected under Northern 
Territory law.  
The Panel called for public submissions, (1257 were ultimately received), held 52 community 
forums, mostly in regional and remote areas, conducted 151 public hearings, and held many 
informal discussions. The Panel also commissioned specific pieces of work. A wide range of other 
documents were also considered. The Panel’s approach to assessing and weighing evidence is 
documented in its final report.  
The Panel progressively published material on its website, including written submissions, 
community updates (generally several each month), transcribed versions of oral submissions, and 
live-streams of public hearings. Community members were able to register to receive updates on 
Panel activities sent to their email addresses. The draft final report was provided online, and 
submissions on the draft were sought. The final report, was provided on the Inquiry website, as 
was a summary version in English, and audio translations in nine indigenous languages. The 
Government response was provided on line and widely publicised.  
The Northern Territory Government accepted all of the Inquiry recommendations, many of which 
involved regulatory or policy change, and lifted the moratorium on hydraulic fracturing. The 
Inquiry’s conclusions continue to be criticised by some stakeholders, and there has been some 
ongoing criticism at the lack of a climate scientist on the Panel. There has also been praise for the 
consultative, and transparent nature of the process.  
                                               
33  See: https://frackinginquiry.nt.gov.au/.  
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7.6 Independent Scientific Panel Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracture 
Stimulation in Western Australia  
This Inquiry was charged with identifying the risks associated with hydraulic fracture stimulation in 
specific areas of onshore Western Australia, with considering what regulatory mechanisms could 
be used to limit and manage those risks, and with recommending a scientific approach. Fracking 
had already been banned in some on-shore areas of the state, and a moratorium was in place for 
the remainder.  
The Inquiry was conducted by a five person expert Panel appointed by the Western Australian 
Government. Panellists’ expertise was widely publicised. There was no representation from 
stakeholder groups on the Panel. While the Panel were open about the various types of 
information they would be considering in the Inquiry, there appears to have been no explicit 
explanation of how that evidence would be tested and weighed.   
Government media releases emphasised that the Inquiry was required to hold three public 
meetings (one each in the Kimberley, the Midwest and Perth areas) and to call for public 
submissions. Beyond this, the Inquiry appears to have had control over its own day to day 
operations.  
In practice, the Panel called for public submissions (ultimately more than 9,500 were received), 
`invited submissions from more than two dozen organisations’, held seven public meetings, and 
reviewed `many hundreds’ of technical and research reports.34  The panel responded to requests 
from stakeholders for greater engagement with the Inquiry by expanding the number of public 
meetings originally planned, and supporting a four month extension to the public submission 
period. The Panel’s final report was also subjected to technical peer review.  
Over the course of the Inquiry, information, including summaries of public meetings, submissions 
(de-identified as necessary), and Panel-produced background papers, were provided on the 
Inquiry website. Notice of public meetings was given through local newspapers, as well as by email 
(to those who had previously indicated interest), and on social media. The final Panel report, and 
accompanying appendices was released on the Inquiry website, and widely publicised. 
The Western Australian Government utilised the Panel Report, as the basis for its decisions to 
remove the moratorium in so far as it applied to fracking on existing petroleum titles, subject to new 
requirements for consent by traditional owners and farmers, and other additional regulatory 
restrictions.35 The Government response drew both praise and criticism from stakeholders.  The 
Inquiry itself has largely been seen as a credible process.   
                                               
34 See: https://frackinginquiry.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/final_report.pdf  
35 See: https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/McGowan  
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7.7 Independent Expert Panel for Mining in the Greater Sydney 
Water Catchment (New South Wales) 
This current GCII has been instituted in response to community concerns about the cumulative 
impact of mining on water quantity in the Greater Sydney Water Catchment.36 The Panel has been 
charged with reviewing existing approaches to predicting, monitoring, and managing mining 
impacts on water quantity, and with providing government with advice on how these approaches 
may be improved.  
The five person Panel was appointed directly by the New South Wales Government. The basis for 
selection of panellists, and panellists’ expertise, was publicised. There is no representation from 
any stakeholder group on the Panel.  
The Panel has been asked to establish a process for receipt of public submissions, and to 
undertake site visits. Beyond this, the conduct of this GCII is a matter for the Panel. There is 
currently no information publicly available which indicates how the Panel proposes to test, and 
weigh, information provided to it. 
Minutes of all Panel meetings are available on a Government website, as are the Panel TOR, 
submissions made to it, and a progress report. There is a stated intention to continue to provide 
regular public updates on the Panel’s work. The New South Wales Government has committed to 
making the Panel report publicly available, and to broad dissemination of Panel findings once 
these are available.  
8. Implications of GCIIs for CCIIs 
As our exploration of GCIIs indicates, notwithstanding some criticisms, these inquiries have 
generally been seen as credible efforts to inquire into controversial issues.37 Available information 
suggests that each commissioning government was acutely aware of the importance of 
establishing, and then maintaining, public and stakeholder confidence in GCII processes. 
Decisions to choose ‘known’ individuals to chair Panels; selection of individual panellists on the 
sole basis of their expertise; publication of the reasons for panellist selection; requiring, and 
announcing the requirement for, extensive stakeholder consultation; and setting expectations for 
regular communications between GCII Panels and stakeholders; can all be seen in this context.  
The methods used to engage with stakeholders also seem to have contributed to support for GCII 
processes. The call for, and encouragement of, stakeholder generated submissions was welcomed 
by communities in the cases of the Hazelwood (Victoria) and the Hydraulic Fracturing (Northern 
                                               
36  See http://www.chiefscientist.nsw.gov.au/reports/independent-expert-panel-for-mining-in-the-catchment.  
37  Australia’s state-based commissions of inquiry have been the subject of scholarly critique. A prominent 
critique is that while government-led inquiries establish a documented record of the harms caused, and 
offer a foundation for future discussion, they do not necessarily lead to change. See: Cunneen, C., 
Goldson, B., and Russell, S. (2016). “Juvenile justice, young people and human rights in Australia”. 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 28(2), 173-189.  
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Territory) inquiries. GCII willingness to devote considerable time, in communities, to listening to 
individuals and groups was praised in both of these instances. Provision of opportunities for 
stakeholders to comment on submissions made by others, and on draft reports, may similarly have 
played a part in generating community confidence.  
Progressive reporting on GCII activities also meant that communities were not, as they were in the 
cases of several CCIIs, left to speculate on the status of inquiries. An interested stakeholder could 
consult the GCII website, or indeed the GCII itself. Any stakeholder could expect to hear about the 
GCII’s progress through the media.  
The level of transparency shown by most GCIIs was far greater than that exhibited by most CCIIs. 
Publication of submissions, meeting minutes, summaries of consultations, expert reports, 
community updates, and tentative findings, all served to provide a guide as to the range of issues 
being considered, and as an indication of developments in the GCII. GCII efforts to provide final 
reports in a variety of accessible formats are noteworthy. The approach taken in the Scientific 
Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory’s publication of audio translations of the 
summary report in indigenous languages warrants particular mention. 
This study has not sought to compare the funding provided to CCIIs with that allocated to GCIIs. 
Nevertheless we are aware that it is very likely that the full range of independence, stakeholder 
engagement, and transparency measures implemented by some GCIIs were not of the level 
available to CCIIs. It is also the case that some GCII activities, such as public hearings, may not be 
appropriate to CCII circumstances.  
We would not, on the basis of consideration thus far, advocate wholesale adoption of GCII 
methodology by CCIIs. However, our initial review of GCIIs does suggest that there would be value 
in giving further consideration to whether, and how, key aspects of GCII processes could be 
adapted for use by future CCIIs.  
9. A case for applied research 
As our preliminary review suggests, there is much to learn about the potential of CCIIs.  Conducted 
well – with recognition that companies cannot, and should not, seek to control inquiry outcomes – 
CCIIs may provide an additional, credible, avenue for social performance questions to be 
examined and addressed. For this to occur, CCIIs need to be more fully understood, improvement 
opportunities need to be identified and adopted, and, leading practice inquiry procedures would 
need to be delineated, and utilised.  
Against this backdrop, we suggest further work could usefully focus on four areas: 
 understanding of past CCIIs from a company perspective 
 perspectives from other stakeholder groups 
 procedural dimensions 
 guidance materials. 
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9.1 Understanding of past CCIIs from a company perspective 
In considering the potential future utility of CCIIs, it would be useful to gain a deeper understanding 
of why global mining companies – in this case BHP, Glencore, Anglo American, Newmont, 
Goldcorp and Lydian – took a decision to commission an unconventional process of inquiry. 
Engagement with company personnel – at corporate and operational levels – to understand the 
drivers and incentives for engaging in CCIIs would be a fruitful avenue for applied research. In 
doing so, it is imperative that researchers engage across functional domains within the corporate 
structure. This will ensure that a range of perspectives – from social performance to production – 
are actively incorporated into the research. 
Engagement at the Executive and Board levels would provide insight into discussions that took 
place in the lead up to, and during the inquiry process, and provide a greater appreciation of the 
extent to which CCIIs were seen as meeting company needs. Industry engagement could also 
explore the degree to which findings remained “on the radar” of senior executives and operational-
level personnel at the completion of the formal process. 
9.2 Perspectives from across the stakeholder spectrum  
Engagement with other stakeholder groups is essential. Assessment of the appropriateness and 
utility of CCIIs would be incomplete without engagement with groups that were involved in inquiry 
commissioning and operations – panellists, study teams and other support staff. Targeted 
interviews would augment our understanding of how well, or otherwise, CCIIs worked in practice. 
Likewise, if CCIIs are to be comprehensively assessed, then interaction with stakeholder groups 
could provide a more meaningful basis for judging CCII impact. As we have indicated, CCIIs may 
be one means for companies to demonstrate their credentials under the UNGPs. For this to occur, 
CCIIs need to satisfy the process requirements stipulated in the Guiding Principles. It would be 
necessary to understand the extent to which this has been the case in each of the examples 
examined from the perspective of NGOs (national and international), other civil society groups, 
community members, project-affected people and, where appropriate, alleged victims.   
9.3 Procedural dimensions 
Looking to the future, this paper has identified opportunities for improvement in the inception and 
implementation of CCIIs. Those opportunities need to be further assessed and delineated. In 
particular, the potential for CCIIs to adopt and adapt some of the mechanisms used by GCIIs 
requires far more substantial study in the context of an in-depth appreciation of the variations in 
context and circumstances which may apply.  
Lessons are likely to be gleaned through an examination of other inquiry and investigative 
processes, beyond GCIIs, such as human rights fact finding processes in non-industry domains 
(e.g. humanitarian issues and the development sector). Many of the considerations relating to 
independence, transparency, accountability and team configuration, are relevant to other types of 
inquiry processes, including for example the emerging arena of human rights impact assessment 
(HRIA).  
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9.4 Guidance materials 
Further research could inform the development of guidance materials to ensure future CCIIs are 
credible, and defensible, in both purpose and process. This could include a framework, or a base-
level TOR, that defines standard elements across CCIIs, and provides a rationale for ensuring that 
those elements are strong. Guidance could cover the appointment of panellists, protection of 
victims, handling evidence, resourcing, timing, communication and dealing with objections during 
the inquiry process itself. 
Concluding remark 
There is a growing consensus on the need to better understand the mining, human rights and the 
company-community interface. In order to determine whether CCIIs – or other such forms of 
engagement – hold value in understanding and remediating complex cases, there will need to be 
investment in targeted social research. Support for these studies could be organised directly with 
industry, including companies and financiers, or through collaborative arrangements that also 
include governments and foundations.  
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